

July 26, 1989

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 5615

[Roll No. 209]

AYES—339

Ackerman Fugue Michel Sandquist Vandegrift Wirth
 Akaka Gaydos Mikulski Swift Volkmer Wise
 Albona Golderson Miller (CA) Synar Vucanovich Wolf
 Anderson Octas Miller (OH) Tallyn Walgren Wolpe
 Andrews (NC) Gibbons Mineta Tauke Walker Wortley
 Andrews (TX) Gilman Minish Tausin Waxman Wright
 Annunzio Gingrich Molinari Thomas (CA) Weber Wyden
 Anthony Olickman Mollohan Thomas (GA) Whitehurst Wylie
 Applegate Gomarez Montgomery Torres Whitley Young (AK)
 Archer Goodling Moody Torricelli Traxler Whittaker Young (FL)
 Aspin Gore Moore Udall Williams (MT) Valentine Winn Young (MO)
 Badham Graddis Moorehead
 Barnard Gramm Morrison (CT) NOES—82
 Barnes Green Morrison (WA) Addabbo Ford (TN) Mosley
 Bartlett Gregg Mrazek AuColn Frank Oakar
 Bateman Gundersen Murphy Bates Garcia Oberstar
 Bjornsona Hall, Ralph Murtha Bedell Gray Ottinger
 Bennett Hall, Sam Myers Blangi Hall (IN) Owens
 Bereuter Hamborsky Natcher Boxer Hall (OH) Patterson
 Berman Hammescheidt Neel Brown (CA) Harkin Paul
 Bethune Haas Nelson Brown (CO) Howard Petri
 Billrikis Hansen (ID) Nichols Burton (CA) Jacobs Rodino
 Billek Hansen (UT) Nelson Clay Johnson Rostenkowski
 Bachert Harrison Nowak Coleman (TX) Kaptur Royal
 Boggs Hartnett O'Brien Collins Kastenmeier Sabo
 Boland Hatcher Olin Coughlin Kildee Savage
 Boner Hefner Ortiz Crockett Leach Schroeder
 Bonker Hertel Oxley Packard Dellums Leiberman
 Borski Hightower Miller Panetta Doran Lehman (FL) Shannon Skonkai
 Bosco Hoyer Hubbard Perkins Durbin Leeland St. Germain
 Boucher Hills Pickle Edwards (CA) Lovins Stark
 Breaux Holt Hopkins Palma Early Lowry (WA) Lovins Stokes
 Britt Hunter Hutto Porter Price Purnell Ferraro Studs
 Brooks Horton Penn Purnell Postlethwaite McNulty
 Broomfield Hoyer Hubbard Perkins Ford (MI) Mitchell Vento
 Broyhill Hubbard Pickle Edwards (IL) Evans (IL) Martinez Weaver
 Bryant Huckabee Hughes Porter Ferraro McClain
 Burton (IN) Hughes Porter Postlethwaite McNulty
 Byron Hunter Porter Purnell Mitchell Yates

NOT VOTING—22

Alexander Gephardt Schuise
 Ray Bevill Guarini Vander Jagt
 Resula Reid Bonior Hawkins Watkins
 Reid Richardson Coelho Heftel Williams (OH)
 Richardson Connors Lewis (CA) Wilson
 Ridge Dixon Oney Ziehau

□ 1900

The Clerk announced the following pair:

On this vote:

Mr. Guarini for, with Mr. Rangel against. Messrs. NIELSON of Utah, BERMAN, CARR, BROOKS, WAXMAN, WYDEN, and ROSE changed their votes from "no" to "aye."

Mr. OWENS and Mr. STUDDS changed their votes from "aye" to "no."

So the amendment offered as a substitute for the amendment was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. (Mr. MURTHA). The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Colorado (Mrs. SCHROEDER), as amended.

The amendment, as amended was agreed to.

□ 1910

Mr. DANIEL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to engage in a colloquy with my colleague from New York, the distinguished chairman of the procurement subcommittee.

During the committee's action on the bill procurement funds were reduced so as to not permit the funding for production surge capability for the F-16 engine, the TOW II missile, and the Phoenix missile. I understand that the reason for this reduction was not that the committee was opposed to the development of surge production capability for these important items. Is my understanding correct?

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DANIEL. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. STRATTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The understanding of my distinguished colleague is absolutely correct. The subcommittee is very much concerned with the ability to rapidly increase production, if the need should arise, for many defense items, including the three items you named.

Mr. DANIEL. If the Department of Defense were to submit a reprogramming request to use funds to develop a surge production capability for the F-16 engines, the TOW II missiles, the Phoenix missiles, or such other defense items for which a surge production capability would be desirable, such a request could be considered by the committee. Is that correct?

Mr. STRATTON. Your understanding is absolutely correct. There is no reason why the committee would not consider such a reprogramming request.

Mr. DANIEL. A final point. If the committee considered reprogramming to develop the surge production capability for these or other defense items to be appropriate, the reprogramming request could be approved. Is that correct?

Mr. STRATTON. Again, your understanding is absolutely correct. The reduction in funding for development of a surge production capability for the F-16 engines, the TOW II missile, and the Phoenix missile was without prejudice to reprogramming for these requirements.

Mr. DANIEL. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for his clarification of this important point.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

If I might have the attention of the chairman and for the edification of the Members just so that we will all know what to expect this evening, it has been this Member's understanding that we were going to come up much earlier in the afternoon, and when the bill was brought back to the floor that we would proceed with the bill until its completion this evening.

Based on that assumption, we have been working with staff and with various Members interested in offering amendments, and it is my understanding from staff there are some 30 amendments that have been printed and that we, in an effort to conclude deliberation on the bill, have agreed to

accept about 20 of them, without having to vote on them.

Is this the chairman's understanding?

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKINSON. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. PRICE. I think we have accepted about 21 of those amendments so far.

Our intention, as of now, is to finish the bill tonight.

Mr. DICKINSON. I would certainly hope that we could do so and certainly we on this side will do everything that we can to eliminate unnecessary debate and to try to move as expeditiously as possible.

Mr. PRICE. With the cooperation of the Members I am certain that we can complete the bill tonight.

Mr. DICKINSON. I would think it would be of interest to the Members to know that we have agreed to accept some 20-odd amendments that have been printed in an effort to come to a successful conclusion this evening. And we will be willing to stay here as long as is necessary.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. DELLUMS

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. DELLUMS: Page 26, after line 25, insert the following new section:

PROHIBITION ON ASSIGNING TROOPS TO OVERTHROW GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA

Sec. 505. No personnel authorized by this title shall be assigned to the mission of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua.

(Mr. DELLUMS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order on the amendment.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman was not on his feet in a timely fashion.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will advise the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON) that he is too late with his point of order.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, as I said, this amendment is very straightforward. It says, "No personnel authorized by this title shall be assigned to the mission of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua."

Nothing can be plainer, nothing can be more simple.

It would seem to me, Mr. Chairman, that this amendment could be construed as an administration amendment since this administration has stated on a number of occasions that it is not its purpose to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua.

I would suggest to the distinguished chairman and the distinguished ranking minority member that they ought to accept this amendment. It would seem to me that it simply makes very

clear that the purpose of this country is not to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. DICKINSON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Well, if it will help forestall debate, I am willing to accept it on this side.

Mr. DELLUMS. I appreciate that from my distinguished ranking minority member.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, we will accept the amendment.

Mr. DELLUMS. I won one on the military budget.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS).

The amendment was agreed to.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk which I do not choose to offer at this time.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter into a colloquy with the chairman of the subcommittee.

Mr. Chairman, the amendment that I have at the desk would raise the end strength in the Navy and Marines by 6,000 personnel. The Navy had requested 12,000. We are in a building period with new ship construction, 20 new ships are planned for fiscal year 1983 and 1984. It was the feeling of the committee that we should utilize Reserve units for this mission.

I have some grave problems with that. I think that using the Navy Reserve units would reduce the Active Force level without reducing our overseas presence. Reserve components do not share our overseas commitment. There is no way in my estimation that the Reserve units can be weekend warriors which we have been able to use so effectively in the Army and the Air Force.

The Naval Reserves can and will fight when they are mobilized. They cannot significantly offset the Active Force requirements right now on overseas assignments, or on sea duty assignments in peacetime.

I would like to ask the Chairman what his feeling is on the fact that Congress has authorized an expanded Active Navy and an expanded Naval Reserve in response to the urgent national need for worldwide naval capabilities.

Does the gentleman feel that utilizing Reserve Forces for the active Navy is a means by which we can enhance our readiness?

□ 1920

Mr. ASPIN. If the gentleman will yield, the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation of the Committee on Armed Services, when we were considering this issue, did look into the adequacy of what we thought were the available forces to

deal with the new ships coming on the line and the requirements of the defense. It was our view that denying the increase in force strength that we would be able to accomplish the missions that the Navy set out.

As the gentlewoman knows, we are trying to encourage all services, not just the Navy, but all services, to make better use of the Reserve Forces, that the total force concept that the U.S. Defense Department, the U.S. Government, has supported for a long time has not been effectively implemented, and we are trying to encourage all services to make better use of the Reserves. That is our goal. And we are trying to get them to make some studies. The subcommittee is going to hold some hearings on the issue of the use of the Reserves, and we are going to try to encourage the use of the Reserves by the forces.

Mrs. BYRON. I have no problem with the use of the Reserves in the Army and the Air Force. I do have a problem when we are talking about a three-ocean commitment for the Navy, with a one-and-a-half-ocean size Navy. The Navy must be able to support the national strategies as crises develop. I think we have seen that fairly dramatically in the last week. I do not think Reserve units are ones that can be pulled into the Navy on a long-term basis.

Mr. ASPIN. I understand the gentlewoman's concern. What we clearly had in mind was the use of the Reserves in other functions so that the Navy can free the use of regular seamen and regular naval personnel in use in the new ships coming on the line.

Mrs. BYRON. I then think we have serious problems with active ships and squadrons providing their presence on overseas assignments and on sea assignments. Then we run into a morale problem with those individuals that we cannot consistently ask to be deployed either overseas or at sea.

Mr. ASPIN. I understand. But there is also a number of naval personnel who are not being deployed overseas who could be deployed overseas, and you substitute the Reserve personnel for those people.

Mrs. BYRON. Is that fair to those Navy personnel who have just come back from an overseas deployment to be sent out again, for a Reserve unit to take their assignment?

Mr. ASPIN. No; it is not the intention of the amendment or of the subcommittee to do that.

Mrs. BYRON. Well, I feel very strongly on the end strength. They have requested the 12,000. I had planned to offer an amendment to increase by 6,000, which is a compromise by 50 percent. Because of the time constraint I will not offer that amendment now.

Mr. ASPIN. I appreciate the gentlewoman's comments, and I would like to assure the gentlewoman that we will continue to look at this and to

monitor this issue. It is not going to go away. It is not a one-shot proposition. We are talking about something here that we are going to have to deal with next year. We clearly are going to have to deal with it in conference with the Senate. We will deal with it next year, and we will continue to monitor it to make sure the gentlewoman's concerns are looked after.

Mrs. BYRON. And I will be watching.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. SHANNON

Mr. SHANNON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. SHANNON: At the end of title V (page 28, after line 25) insert the following:

LIMIT ON NUMBER OF ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STATIONED IN EL SALVADOR

Sec. 505. (a) The number of active duty military advisers stationed in El Salvador shall not exceed 55. The number of active duty military personnel stationed in El Salvador shall not exceed the number so stationed on July 25, 1983.

Sec. 505. (b) There shall be excluded in applying the limitations contained in paragraph (a) any members of the Armed Forces stationed in El Salvador with respect to whom the President has submitted a report pursuant to section 4(a)(1) of the war powers resolution.

(Mr. SHANNON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SHANNON. Mr. Chairman, last weekend, a lot of people around the country picked up their Sunday papers and read the latest chapter in the increasingly disturbing story of Central America. We learned that the administration is again considering raising the number of American military advisers in El Salvador. We learned that Caspar Weinberger's plan to increase from 55 to 125 the number of U.S. military advisers had finally made its way onto the President's desk. The Defense Department has advised the President that this increase is essential to help improve the performance of the Salvadoran military against the guerrillas.

Today, as we take up the DOD authorization bill, I think it is absolutely essential that we take a good hard look at this new magic number of 125. Where is it taking us, this increase in military advisers from 55 to 125?

Mr. Chairman, whatever money we agree to authorize today for the strong reliable defense of our Nation, I think we have to make some judgments about what—unfortunately—is quickly becoming the focal point for American military muscle power.

This Congress needs to make a very clear statement today on how we want our military budget used in El Salvador.

And for that reason, I am offering an amendment which says "No" to any increase in the number of military advisers in El Salvador.

There are several very sensible reasons that I think people on both sides of the aisle would want to join in set-

ting a clear limit—at the current level of 55—to the number of advisers this Government will have in El Salvador.

First, the current limit of 55 is purely an informal one. It was agreed to by the administration following the suggestion of congressional leaders in 1981. But that limit has never been written into law.

Some say that this number has come to be a symbol of American restraint in El Salvador. Whether it is in fact a symbol of restraint or mere camouflage remains to be seen. What is important for the Congress—Democrats and Republicans—to realize is that as things now stand, we have provided the administration a blank check. The current limit is totally beyond our ability to enforce or control. The administration can put in as many or as few military advisers as it chooses, with or without the approval of this body. And without the approval of the citizens of this country.

I want us to ask ourselves: Do we want to let the situation stand that way and let the chips fall where they may? Or are we willing to say—very clearly—what number of American advisers we want there?

There is a second point to consider. The proposal to increase the number of advisers includes the suggestion that our advisers be allowed to increase their mobility. In plain English, the Defense Department wants our advisers to do more than just prepare the Salvadoran Army for combat. It wants them to lead them into combat as well.

But right off the bat there is a contradiction because this recommendation for increased mobility is coupled with language that prohibits American servicemen from being involved in combat operations or working in combat zones. That is a catch 22 if I ever heard one. How are our advisers to travel with Salvadoran troops into the field and yet not become involved in combat? This is doublespeak of the first order. Did not Vietnam teach us anything about guerrilla warfare? Since when do guerrilla forces announce the location of their next attack.

It is an absurd idea—that our advisers can travel into the field with Salvadoran troops and not become involved in combat themselves.

Very simply, ladies and gentleman, more military advisers could mean more American casualties. And that—pure and simple is what this amendment is all about—putting a limit American risk in El Salvador.

Mr. Chairman, I am not going to make the argument, which I deeply believe, that the El Salvadoran Government does not deserve our military assistance. I am only going to make the very simple point that we can already train all the Salvadoran troops we want, without sending one American mother's son into El Salvador.

We have already trained three Salvadoran battalions, each of which gen-

erally numbers about 1,000—one at Fort Bragg and two in El Salvador. We have trained 477 Salvadoran officers candidates at Fort Benning and have begun training there for another 500. We have a training facility in Puerto Castillo, Honduras, to which the administration recently dispatched 125 Green Berets, and where a fourth Salvadoran battalion is currently being trained. And so far, we have trained directly over 5,000 Salvadoran infantrymen and officers.

I think that whatever our individual judgments, there is no way anyone can say that our Government is not already taking a very, very active role in El Salvador.

The mistake would be for this Congress not to put on a ceiling, not to take some control over what I think all of us must acknowledge is a very volatile situation.

With this amendment, we can do that, we can create that ceiling; create that control.

We should ask ourselves what the American people expect from us. They want to know that the potential for our involvement in El Salvador is limited. They want assurance that we will never again go sending more and more and more American soldiers into some kind of bottomless pit.

Let's set a limit and let's do it now.

□ 1930

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, this is not the time nor the place to be setting foreign policy as to what this Government should or should not be doing in El Salvador. This is an amendment presented to us that had not been seen 3 minutes before it was offered on the floor.

This is not the forum to debate what we should be doing in El Salvador. We have a Committee on Foreign Affairs. We have a Committee on Intelligence. We have legislation pending that will come up either next week or when we come back from the Committee on Intelligence. We have already heard 4 hours of secret debate dealing with the general subject matter.

Now, at this late hour, on a defense bill, to bring in single-shot amendments that would try to shape and form the public policy, the foreign policy, of this country is just wrong, ill advised, and should not be entertained at the present time.

There are some 8,000 Cubans next door in Nicaragua, if we want to start counting people, but to handcuff this Government, to form its foreign policy in a defense bill, is ill conceived, ill timed, and should be turned down.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts.

It is very important that we talk about this because anybody who has been to Central America begins to un-

derstand how serious the implications of our involvement can be. Let me talk about my visit there and my meetings with the military from El Salvador.

I must say I was blown away by their candor. I asked how many civilians had been murdered by military people and they very casually pulled out a book and started counting. Well, I thought, at least they were honest enough to admit thousands had been killed by military people in El Salvador.

I then said, "Do you ever punish officers for not overseeing their men properly? We in the United States would certainly do that if so many were killed. If we had thousands of people who had been killed by the military in this country, I certainly hope we would call the officers in and say, 'Wait a minute. What goes here?'"

They said, "No, you see, we cannot do that because we do not have enough officers for the men, so we just cannot hold the officers accountable for the men."

Then we had some more vistas about, "Tell me what it is really like."

They said, "You do not really understand what it is like here, because another reason we cannot control our troops is that people in the military are allowed to go home and work for someone else, for another private army." They are allowed to take their weapon home and moonlight a little at night in private armies.

So all those jurisdiction lines become very blurred, and for us, who are in the United States, we assume that their military is run the same as ours is. Let me tell you, it is not the same as here. We do not allow wealthy private people to have armies, private armies, of 5,000 and 6,000 people that they hire from the U.S. Marines or Army or a police force, or whatever, and at night they go home and take their weapons home and work for the other guy.

All that makes dealing with their military terribly, terribly messy. So what did we do? We began by saying, "What we must do, then, is train more officers, train more officers, get the officer-to-man ratio down." So we get more officers in there, we get a better idea of what is going on, stop the moonlighting, and so forth.

None of that has happened. The officer-to-enlisted-men ratio has not gone down at all. In talking to different people who are providing refuge for many of the El Salvadoran immigrants and refugees who come up here, they are telling us that our El Salvadoran military training program is a CETA program. Let me say that again. It is a basic CETA program. They are saying many people that we train to be officers down there, the minute they get their training they come up here because opportunities and jobs are better, and if they have a little English it is much better. It is a CETA program and it really is not

doing what we thought it would be doing.

So we are going in there really blindfolded, not understanding what life is like down there, not understanding that their institutions are not analogous to ours. We are putting in more money. We are making more commitments. We are putting more of our people's lives on the line to work with them.

We are getting into a real mess. There was a proposal in the Washington Post this last week that made a lot of sense to me, and that was that we should not do one more thing militarily in El Salvador until their officers stop wearing sunglasses so we could look them in the eye. I think there is a lot to be said for that, because we do not have the eye contact we need and we do not know when we are getting the straight story.

There is another piece that I think is terribly important. We also hear over and over and over again, "We can't hold them accountable for undue violence because while the population of El Salvador is about the size of Chicago, they do not have as many people as the Chicago police force." Why? Well, the reason they do not is that the wealthy do not pay taxes. The wealthy families do not want to pay taxes. They say that is what we gringos do.

We are getting into this quagmire called El Salvador deeper and deeper. All I want to say in this week that is the 200th anniversary of Simon Bolívar, who was the liberator of Latin America, is do not forget Peru. Peru has done what we begged countries in Latin America to do. It has a democratic government that we recognize. It has President Belaunde in charge. It is being run around. It is in real trouble. We do not give them any aid of any substantial amount. We would prevent trouble through economic aid to Peru now. We only seem to pay attention when countries run to us and make their situation into a gigantic East-West confrontation. Then we say we will deal with anybody if they are pro-West if Marxists are around. If they are not around, we forget them until conditions deteriorate until Marxists can come in.

It has gotten us into trouble before; it is going to get us into trouble again. It is an absolute formula for disaster. I just think it is terribly important that we have this debate at this point and see what we can do to stop it.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. DELLUMS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts.

I would, secondly, concur in all the remarks made by my distinguished colleague on the Committee on Armed

Services, the gentlewoman from Colorado.

I would simply like to offer one additional thought. I came to Congress in 1971 when the issue of the Vietnam war loomed very large in this country, an issue that split this Nation asunder. It split families, it split friends, it split regions of this Nation. It was an extraordinary issue.

I thought about the handful of people in the sixties who raised the question of America's involvement in Vietnam. I thought about the handful of people who had the foresight and the courage to vote against the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. I thought about the courage of people who said, "We are going down the wrong road in the sixties," and who stood up and said, "Let us not move forward. Let us not end up down the road with a number of people fighting and dying in the rice fields of Southeast Asia."

It would seem to me that at some point, at least theoretically, there may have been 55 American advisers in Vietnam, but at some point it doubled and tripled and quadrupled, and suddenly we were involved in a war that ended up with 55,000 American casualties, and untold numbers of dead Vietnamese people.

And for what reason? That tiny nation 10,000 miles from the United States never posed any clear and imminent danger to this country. I would suggest that what is happening in Central America, much closer than Vietnam, poses no clear and imminent threat to this country militarily.

The amendment of the gentleman from Massachusetts simply says maintain the status quo. This gentleman would like to see all 55 advisers out of El Salvador, because the problems in El Salvador do not lend themselves to a military solution. The problems in Central America are economic and political and social and cultural, and they have to be solved in that context. No bullets and bombs or bayonets are going to solve the problems of Central America.

The question we must raise among ourselves is: What message do we communicate? What message do we communicate to other nations around the world if we cannot find it within ourselves and our intellect and our spirit and our political acumen to address the realities of the problems in Central America without going to war? What do we say to our brothers and sisters in the Middle East that is a tinder box that may eventually engulf the world in war? What do we say to them? Out of one side of our mouths we say, "Sit down and negotiate. Let us not take it to war."

But when they look across the water at us, in our own hemisphere, we are prepared to escalate the violence and escalate our military activity in this region of the world. It is a very contradictory statement.

It would seem to me, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, that we ought to come down on the side, as a superpower, of encouraging peaceful solutions to the problems of Central America.

□ 1940

The American people do not buy the notion that the problems in El Salvador and the problems in Nicaragua are military problems.

I would ask my colleagues to think about this rhetorical question. Would people be struggling in Central America if there were no Soviet Union?

I believe the answer is "Yes," because the objective realities are that there is poverty and human misery and human rights violations that require the human spirit to rebel. It would seem to me that as a nation born out of that spirit of rebellion, that we ought to be concerned about dealing with the objective realities of human misery in Central America, not heightening the tension.

So all this amendment says is, stop the number of advisers at 55. Let us not find ourselves escalating to the point that our sons and our fathers and our brothers and our uncles find themselves face down in Central America because we were too violent to understand the need to withdraw from this militaristic approach to solving the problems in Central America.

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to my colleague.

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, I thank my distinguished colleague for yielding to me.

I ask if the gentleman will yield also to the gentleman from Massachusetts for a question which I would like to put to him on the amendment he has offered.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

(At the request of Mr. Weiss, and by unanimous consent, Mr. DELLUMS was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, as the gentleman knows, there is a legal action pending challenging the right of the administration of our Government to have the 55 advisers in El Salvador, in what we suggest is a violation of the war powers resolution.

Mr. DELLUMS. Exactly.

Mr. WEISS. That action has been decided at the lower court level. It is now pending on appeal.

If the gentleman would yield, I would like to ask the gentleman from Massachusetts whether it is his intention or not to pass judgment or to legitimize the presence of the original 55 American advisers in El Salvador.

Mr. DELLUMS. I think that is an outstanding question. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts, the

author of the amendment, for purposes of clarification.

Mr. SHANNON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Certainly in no way does my amendment imply that the War Powers Act has already been complied with.

In section (b) of my amendment, it would apply only to any future attempts on the part of the administration to send any troops into El Salvador. It does not deal at all with the question of the 55 who are already there and does not imply that the War Powers Act has been complied with to this point.

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts for his response, because this way it will be up to the Court to determine whether in fact the administration and the President are in violation of the war powers resolution for having those original 55 American advisers in El Salvador.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has again expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. DELLUMS was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I have made the major thrust of my argument.

I would simply conclude by indicating that four nations, known as the Contadora movement have offered a peace plan. It seems to me that if we really are concerned about our brothers and sisters in Latin America, that we have to embrace this effort on the part of our Latin American allies to find a peaceful solution to the problems of Central America.

Mr. Chairman, all this amendment does, in this gentleman's estimation, is to stop this militarization of Central America from escalating.

I think the gentleman from Massachusetts serves us well in offering this amendment. I hope my colleagues will support it.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the author of the amendment a few questions, because I have some problems about dealing with amendments like this that are offered kind of quick, without really thinking through whether what we are doing is the right thing.

I have a lot of sympathy for what the gentleman from Massachusetts wants to do. I think the gentleman and I agree essentially on the Central American issue; but I worry about this amendment.

First of all, I think that the issue raised by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Weiss) is a valid issue. It seems to me that if we pass this amendment we are saying in effect that you do not need the War Powers Act to put in the 55 advisers. I mean, whether that is the intention of the

gentleman or not, I would think that the Court having looked at that would say that therefore what we are seeing here is that the War Powers Act was not violated.

Mr. SHANNON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. SHANNON. That is not what the amendment says, nor is it the intention of the amendment, nor do I see any implication in the amendment that that is what we are trying to say.

All my amendment seeks to do—

Mr. ASPIN. Well, I understand what the gentleman is seeking to do; but there are two sections to the amendment there. Section 505(a) says:

The number of active duty military advisers stationed in El Salvador shall not exceed 55.

Then section 505(b) says:

There shall be excluded in applying the limitations contained in paragraph (a) any members of the armed forces stationed in El Salvador with respect to whom the President has submitted a report pursuant to the War Powers resolution.

In other words, the gentleman is saying that in addition to those 55, the War Powers Act would not apply, that that limitation would not apply if you come in with the War Powers Act.

Mr. SHANNON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. ASPIN. I yield.

Mr. SHANNON. All I am saying, what we want to do with this amendment is freeze the status quo as far as military personnel are concerned in El Salvador unless the President wants to come back to the Congress and seek specific authorization to send more advisers, or unless he feels some need to take some action which would fall under the War Powers Act. That is all.

Mr. ASPIN. Except that there is not any provision whereby the President can exceed the number of 55.

Mr. SHANNON. Only if he chooses to comply with the reporting requirements of the War Powers Act.

Mr. ASPIN. Then how can the gentleman say that the War Powers Act does not apply to 55, but starts to apply if you put in 56?

Mr. SHANNON. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, I think I made it clear that I had made no judgment whether or not the War Powers Act applies.

Mr. ASPIN. But the gentleman's amendment, whether the gentleman intended it or not, does make a difference. It shows that you do not need the War Powers Act for the first 55, because you are not saying that the President would have a War Powers Act; but it says if you want to go more than 55, you have to have the War Powers Act.

Mr. SHANNON. If the gentleman will yield further to me, my amendment makes no implication at all as to the first 55 advisers and the War Powers Act.

Mr. ASPIN. The gentleman keeps saying that.

Mr. SHANNON. That is a matter which is currently being decided by the courts.

Mr. ASPIN. It is, and I am afraid that the gentleman's amendment—we had better be careful. If we pass amendments on the floor without thinking them through, what we are saying, there is a good chance of sending the wrong signals to the wrong people in the wrong way.

I would like to see the gentleman offer an amendment which would say that we should not have more than 55 advisers in El Salvador and then maybe have some provision whereby if the President wanted to increase it, Congress could approve, but we do not have that.

Let me raise two other problems, because I am afraid that my time is running out.

Mr. SHANNON. If I might just respond to the gentleman's comment, I would just like to say that I am sorry the amendment is not clear to the gentleman. It is an amendment which we have gone over extensively with legislative counsel and others outside and with many Members to whom it is perfectly clear. If there is any lack of clarity as to the implications as to the present advisers, I think that was cleared up in the colloquy between the gentleman from New York and myself.

I understand that the gentleman is unable to recognize what this amendment tries to do, but I think most Members understand it.

Mr. ASPIN. The gentleman from Massachusetts says the number of active duty military personnel stationed in El Salvador shall not exceed the number so stationed on July 25, 1983.

Let me ask the gentleman, suppose there was a rescue operation to take out people from El Salvador. According to military terminology, those people would be stationed in El Salvador. According to the war powers resolution, they would not be required to be reported under the War Powers Act. How does that work?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN) has expired.

(At the request of Mr. STRATTON, and by unanimous consent, Mr. ASPIN was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. SHANNON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. ASPIN. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. SHANNON. In that circumstance, the reporting requirements only of the War Powers Act, section 4(a) would come into play. If the President wanted to send any military forces into El Salvador, then he would be bound by those reporting requirements and have to come to the Congress with the specified report.

Mr. ASPIN. But the War Powers Act specifically excludes rescued people.

Mr. SHANNON. For purposes of this legislation, this amendment specifies that just the reporting requirements as outlined in the War Powers Act shall apply to any further use of military personnel above today's limit, July 25, 1983, in El Salvador.

Mr. ASPIN. If there are any other people—in other words, any other changes to the War Powers Act, I mean, the War Powers Act has some specific exclusions. What the gentleman is saying is that we do not exclude anything.

Mr. SHANNON. What I am saying is that if the President finds any need to send further military forces to El Salvador, he shall report to the Congress as required in the War Powers Act as to what lies there and how.

Mr. ASPIN. Even those troops that are excluded by the War Powers Act? The gentleman is rewriting the War Powers Act in the case of El Salvador.

Mr. SHANNON. No. What I am doing is incorporating one small section of the War Powers Act on reporting in this Department of Defense authorization.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN) has again expired.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN) may proceed for 2 additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I have stood over here trying to seek recognition for the last 20 minutes and there has been a nice little round robin going on.

I am going to object unless I get a chance to say something in this conversation, because nobody on this side of the aisle has been recognized for more than 1 minute and that was the end of it.

□ 1950

Does everybody understand?

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri. I am telling everybody that I am going to object the next time this happens if we do not get recognized.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Does the gentleman object?

Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri. I object, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Objection is heard.

Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, this is a perfect example of why we should not be working on this type of legislation in this type of atmosphere. We should not be entertain-

ing amendments with such far ramifications that the author cannot even explain them.

I say where is the Foreign Affairs Committee when you need them? I mean, I do not see any members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. I see one or two here, but I do not see the chairman. I do not see the subcommittee chairmen on any of these issues that should be discussed.

Now, if we are going to talk about El Salvador and Central America tonight, we are not going to get this bill through and we can go on and on and on, and we can find lots of ways to have this little colloquy. And if we have the Central American issue up tomorrow, fine. That is when it should be debated.

Let me ask the gentleman from Massachusetts a question. He is very concerned about the 55 advisers in El Salvador. Is he concerned about the 1,800 active Marines over in Lebanon, and why has the gentleman selected and just listed the 55 in El Salvador?

Mr. SHANNON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. SHANNON. Let me just say to the gentleman that I have heard this argument made from the other side on a couple of occasions tonight.

There would be nobody in this Chamber happier than I if this amendment were not germane. The reason it is germane to the Department of Defense authorization is because we have a military commitment in Central America.

Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri. Could the gentleman answer my question as to why he lists just the 55? If I were to put in an amendment would the gentleman support an amendment to limit it to 55 in Lebanon?

Mr. SHANNON. I would say to the gentleman—

Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri. Let me say that the reason that the gentleman will not answer the question is that he knows that what he is doing is trying to make a political statement here tonight. He has selectively taken out a part of our active armed forces, 55 out of hundreds of thousands of them, and is making a political statement on a bill which should not have a political statement on there.

We have this issue up tomorrow and the next day and we have bills prepared for it. You should have had your amendment in order earlier on and printed in the Record on that particular bill.

But to come up here and waste our time on this, these types of amendments tonight dealing with Central America, is ludicrous.

But we ought to know what we are doing and if we want to have a full-scale debate on this, I suggest it is not germane even to the issue.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COLEMAN Of Missouri. I yield. Mr. DELLUMS. I will be happy to get some additional time for my colleague.

You have made a number of statements. Let me first say that I tend to concur in the general thrust of your remarks.

For example, the rule was construed in such a fashion that this gentleman has the opportunity under the rule to present an alternative military budget, 1 hour of general debate, and theoretically it could be debated under the 5-minute rule and amended.

Now, my alternative that we worked on for 4 months with a number of people helping us may come up at some time at 12 o'clock or 1 o'clock in the morning. I would not dignify this process by bringing my alternative up at that time of the morning.

Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri. I agree with the gentleman. I understand that the schedule is until midnight or later on such important legislation, and we are spinning our wheels and wasting our time on stuff that should be on another bill entirely.

That is ridiculous. Here we are opening ourselves up to public ridicule. And if they are not watching the President's press conference in 5 minutes, they are going to be watching us, and it is a circus over here.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SEIBERLING. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. DELLUMS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SEIBERLING. I will be happy to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank my colleague for yielding.

I would simply say to my distinguished colleague that what this process is about is politics, and what we are here to do is engage in the business of politics. And what politics is about is establishing policy and establishing the priorities. And if that is not what we are here about, what are we here for?

And to make an argument against this gentleman who raises the question of 55 advisers in Central America as against how many troops are in Lebanon, each of us has the right to address any specific issue. And if it were not germane then it would have been stricken and there would have been a point of order made against it.

The fact that it is germane means that we have a right to debate the matter, and any matter that is germane we ought to be able to come here and debate.

I do not have the time. My colleague has the time. But I am simply saying to challenge that this is a political statement, we are here to make a political statement. I would not shy away from that.

The political statement that we ought to be making here on this amendment is that we do not want to militarize Central America. We do not

want to go forward and Vietnamize Central America. That is a political statement. We are politicians. Each of us represent a half a million people and we ought to be here to try to make that political statement.

I thank my colleague for yielding.

Mr. SEIBERLING. I would just like to make a comment on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts and I wonder if he would come forward because he may want to respond.

It may well be that this amendment by, in effect, indicating that Congress has not taken action to prevent the continuance of the 55 advisers could be construed by the Court as in effect being a ratification by Congress, even though in so many words it is not. But that is not my main point.

The main point is that this establishes a benchmark and says: This far you may go, but not farther, without coming to the Congress and getting the approvals required and the consultations required by the War Powers Act.

We have a President who is not only flaunting the law with respect to aid to anti-Sandinista guerrillas, but who is conducting huge naval maneuvers in both the Caribbean and the Pacific in an effort, as a State Department spokesman has admitted, to intimidate the government of Nicaragua.

Has he consulted the Congress? No.

Has he complied with the War Powers Act? No.

It seems to me that the gentleman's amendment is an extremely important one because it would send a message to the President that the time has come to stop this unilateral action and to come to the Congress, as the War Powers Act requires, and consult with the Members and the leadership before taking any further action.

Mr. SHANNON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SEIBERLING. I am happy to yield to the author of the amendment.

Mr. SHANNON. I want to thank the gentleman for his comments and just say perhaps the gentleman was not in the Chamber when I had a colloquy with the gentleman from New York in which I discussed the case which is pending.

In no way does my amendment make any judgment on that case.

Mr. SEIBERLING. I understand that and I agree with the gentleman.

Mr. SHANNON. I just wanted to make that clear once again.

Mr. SEIBERLING. My point is that even if the amendment were to be held to constitute a ratification of the sending of the 55 advisers there, that is already an accomplished fact.

The important thing is to prevent the expansion of the contingent of the military forces of the United States in El Salvador by unilateral action of the President.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SEIBERLING. I am happy to yield.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I have listened with a great deal of patience, as many of my colleagues have, to this debate on this amendment. One thing that really has not been brought out, we have been pointing out the deficiencies with the United States of America. We have not really talked too much about the Communist expansionist policy in El Salvador.

Mr. SEIBERLING. If that is the purpose of the gentleman rising, I would take back my time.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. May I ask a question, please?

Mr. SEIBERLING. Yes.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. My question of the author is how many foreign advisers, Communist advisers from Cuba, Russia, and other countries are in Nicaragua aiding and abetting the revolutionary movement over there, and how many foreign military troops are there aiding the revolutionary process?

Mr. SEIBERLING. I would just like to say, if I may recapture what is left of my time, I will stipulate to the fact that what the Communists are doing in Central America is dangerous and wrong. I hold no brief for them whatsoever.

But there are other ways to get them out of there besides sending the armed forces of the United States down there. If we send our armed forces there then we become the issue, and that is the big mistake that the administration appears to be making.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, at this particular moment the President of the United States is undoubtedly going on television to talk about this particular issue.

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And I would just like to say that he is the Commander in Chief, and we should give him the support that is necessary to deal with a very, very difficult problem right now. To try to hamstring President Reagan by limiting the number of advisers at a very crucial point in history I think is a step in the wrong direction. He has said that he does not intend to send American troops down there. But at the same time he asked for military aid from this body to help those people fight the battle themselves, the duly-elected Government of El Salvador. We have continually tried to cut that amount of money. You do not want to send aid down there so you obviously want to let the Communists continue to take control of that area of the world, 900 miles from our southern border. In addition you are trying to hamstring the President by not allowing him the latitude he may need to deal with that problem.

If you do not want to give him the financial support, if you do not want

to give him support by allowing advisors down there, what in the world do you want to give him? It sounds like to me that many of you are closing your eyes to the problem. If we do not do something we are going to have to deal with people like Mr. Canatta, who was captured recently. He said in no uncertain terms that the goal of the revolutionaries in Central America is to cause revolutions in all of those countries, to come north through Mexico and force us into an untenable position on our southern border.

Mr. SEIBERLING. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I will not yield.

I submit to you if we do not deal with the Central American problem today we are going to have to deal with it at some time in the future.

I have said this before on this floor. I have an 8-year-old son. There are young people in the audience tonight. I do not want them to go to war in some God-forsaken place south of the U.S. border. Unless we deal with this problem effectively today and give the President the support that he needs we are going to have to face that.

And you folks who say you do not want another Vietnam are going to get us into one because of weakness.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GARCIA. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. SEIBERLING. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GARCIA. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. SEIBERLING. I would like to point out to my colleague from Indiana that this resolution does not say we cannot send any more advisors to El Salvador. It merely says no more can be sent without compliance with the War Powers Act. It ends the unilateralism of the President's policy. I suggest that one of the weaknesses of the President's policy is its very unilateralism, not only with respect to the Congress but with respect to our good neighbors to the south.

They have experienced a long history of intervention, military intervention by the United States.

And when we intervene, even if it is with the best of motives, we then raise vibrations which we perhaps are not as acutely aware of as they are.

When we do that, we make ourselves the issue and make it harder for our neighbors to the south to organize collective actions to deal with the intervention by Cuba and the Soviet Union and the Sandinistas, which ought to be the issue. We ought to be uniting with all of our good neighbors to the south and working with them to prevent intervention by Cubans, Sandinistas or anyone else, instead of imposing our military forces as part of a unilateral effort to solve this problem. This amendment could be very helpful, as the advice of the Congress might be

very useful to the President on this question.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. GARCIA. I would just like to start off by saying to my colleague from Missouri, who is no longer here, he is absolutely correct. There is no question that this is a political debate.

Many of the people in the audience and many of the people who may be watching us throughout the country maybe do not understand our system here in Congress of conferees or both the House and Senate getting together to work out the differences. If this amendment should pass tonight, and if it should be part of this House's package that goes to conference with the Senate, it probably will be eliminated when the conferees get together. The fact is that at this particular moment it is exactly 4 minutes after 8; the President now is speaking on three major networks across the country, delivering a message that we should get more deeply involved in Central America.

And there are those of us who are on this side of the aisle who disagree. The problems of Central America did not start yesterday. They started decades ago. And, yes, we, today, in this Chamber, must make the decisions as to what type of help we want to give our Central American neighbors.

The help we must give those people is not of sending bigger bombs or aircraft carriers; if we truly want to help our neighbors to the south, then I believe we should help them with the most powerful tool we have and that is our economic leverage. The ability to send our technical know-how into Central America.

Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GARCIA. Just a second, I do not yield.

Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri. The gentleman said I was not here.

Mr. GARCIA. I just say that you were right in what you said before. I just agreed with everything you said.

Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri. You did?

Mr. GARCIA. Yes; that is what I said.

The point I am trying to make is right now there are four nations of Spanish-speaking background working, it is called the Contadoras.

They are trying very hard to put a solution together for Central America.

I speak now as a Hispanic. I am not an expert on military affairs and I do not claim to be. I leave that to the chairman of the committee. But I am an expert on one thing, Hispanic culture, because I have been that all my life. And I can tell you that what we must do is let us help ourselves. Who are we to tell people what they should or should not do, when the problem has existed for so long in Central America.

Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GARCIA. No; I will not yield.

We must be the people, in this Chamber, who show, not through subversion, not through covert operations but through what this country is famous and great for, our spirit. And our spirit of warmth and friendship, our spirit to help others. We are not doing that in Central America.

The President is now trying to sell his bill of goods across this country, it should be made very clear to him that we as Hispanics especially, we understand our own cultural background. We ended up in a war in Vietnam where we were killing people of the yellow race, now we are involved in Central America dealing with people of the brown race. Whenever we get involved it is always people who, as we term in our society today, as minorities.

Let us Hispanics help ourselves. Let the Contadora group work, let those four nations help let them go forward.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. GARCIA was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. GARCIA. I believe those four nations are trying. God knows we have enough trouble. But please let these four countries work out the problems, let us not send the U.S.S. *Ranger* into the Caribbean, let us not send the other fleets into the Pacific, for God sake.

Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GARCIA. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri. I am sorry but when you were making the point it would have been more applicable; that is, who invited the 55 military advisers down there?

Mr. GARCIA. Let me just say this to you.

Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri. It was the very people you were talking about.

Mr. GARCIA. The oligarchy in El Salvador created this problem.

Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri. The freely elected people in El Salvador, that is who is in the government.

Mr. GARCIA. Let me say this in response to my colleague from Missouri's statement: Central America has had these problems for many years. In every one of these countries, Somoza was booted out of Nicaragua; El Salvador was a group of 12 to 15 families who are presently living high off the hog in Key Biscayne, Fla.

Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri. But the fact is they had an election, a free election, supervised by international forces and that government, they invited the 55 advisers.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(On request of Mr. LEELAND and by unanimous consent, Mr. GARCIA was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

July 26, 1983

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 5623

Mr. LELAND. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GARCIA. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. LELAND. I thank the gentleman.

How do the people of Latin America, particularly South America and Central America, feel about the United States after the Argentinian encounter with the British?

Mr. GARCIA. There are many of us who felt quite bad that we intervened on the side of Great Britain. The feeling in South America, in Spanish-speaking countries, is that the United States has always considered Spanish-speaking America as the afterthought of the afterthought. It just seems to me that whenever something happens in Europe, we immediately respond. Whenever something happened south of our border we would say "manana." I believe when we finally got involved in South America in the fight between the English and the Argentinians, they had hoped, we would remain neutral, they just wanted us to stay out.

There were some of us who I think in good conscience would probably say we did the right thing. I honestly believe as a Hispanic, it would have been wise to stay out. Let the British and Argentines fight; it was their fight, not ours.

Mr. LELAND. Those very countries are now trying to work out a solution, the Contadora group, and here once again the United States is intervening.

Mr. GARCIA. It is that macho image we constantly try to project and I know we are doing the wrong thing with our military involvement in Central America.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. SHANNON).

The question was taken, and the Chairman pro tempore announced that the noes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. SHANNON. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 170, noes 247, not voting 16, as follows:

(ROLL NO. 270)

AYES—170

Ackerman Addabbo Albosta

Anderson	Gray	Ortiz	Eriksen	Lloyd	Rose
Applegate	Guarini	Ottinger	Evans (IA)	Loeffler	Rostenkowski
AuCoin	Hall (IN)	Owens	Fascell	Lott	Roth
Barnes	Hall (OH)	Panetta	Fiedler	Lowery (CA)	Rowland
Bates	Harkin	Patterson	Fields	Lujan	Rudd
Bedell	Harrison	Paul	Flipper	Lungren	Sawyer
Bellinson	Hawkins	Pease	Forsythe	Mack	Schaefer
Berreuter	Hertel	Penny	Powler	MacKay	Schulze
Berman	Horton	Pritchard	Franklin	Madigan	Sensenbrenner
Boehlert	Howard	Rahall	Frost	Marlenee	Sharp
Boland	Hoyer	Ratchford	Fugua	Marriott	Shaw
Bonior	Jacobs	Reid	Gaydos	Martin (NC)	Shelby
Bonker	Jeffords	Richardson	Gekas	Martin (NY)	Shumway
Borski	Kaptur	Rodino	Gilman	Mezvial	Shuster
Bosco	Kastenmeier	Roe	Gingrich	McCain	Siljander
Boucher	Kennelly	Roukema	Glickman	McCandless	Sisisky
Boxer	Kildee	Roybal	Gore	McCollum	Skeen
Brooks	Kogovsek	Russo	Gradison	McCurdy	Skelton
Brown (CA)	Kotler	Sabo	Gramm	McDade	Slattery
Bryant	Kostmayer	Scheuer	Green	McDonald	Smith (NE)
Burton (CA)	Lantos	Schneider	Gregg	McEwen	Smith (NJ)
Carr	Leach	Schroeder	Gunderson	McGrath	Smith, Denny
Clarke	Lehman (CA)	Schumer	Hall, Ralph	McKinney	Smith, Robert
Clay	Lehman (FL)	Seiberling	Hall, Sam	Mica	Snyder
Coelho	Leland	Shannon	Hamilton	Michel	Solomon
Collins	Levine	Sikorski	Hammerachmidt	Miller (OH)	Spence
Conte	Lipinski	Simon	Hance	Molinari	Spratt
Crockett	Long (LA)	Smith (FL)	Hansen (ID)	Mollohan	Staggers
D'Amours	Long (MD)	Smith (IA)	Hansen (UT)	Montgomery	Stangeland
Daschle	Lowry (WA)	Snowe	Hartnett	Moore	Stenholm
Dellums	Luken	Solans	Hatcher	Moorhead	Stratton
Derrick	Lundine	St Germain	Heffner	Morrison (WA)	Stump
Dixon	Markey	Stark	Hightower	Murtha	Sundquist
Donnelly	Martin (IL)	Stokes	Hiller	Myers	Synar
Dorgan	Martinez	Studds	Hillis	Natcher	Tallan
Downey	Matsui	Swift	Holt	Nelson	Tauzin
Durbin	Mavroules	Tauke	Hopkins	Nichols	Taylor
Dwyer	McCloskey	Torres	Hubbard	Nielson	Thomas (CA)
Dymally	McHugh	Torricelli	Huckaby	O'Brien	Thomas (GA)
Early	McKernan	Towns	Hughes	Olin	Valentine
Eckart	McNulty	Traxler	Hunter	Oxley	Vander Jagt
Edgar	Mikulski	Vento	Hutto	Packard	Vandergriff
Edwards (CA)	Miller (CA)	Volkmer	Hyde	Parris	Vucanovich
Fazio	Mineta	Walgren	Ireland	Pashayán	Walker
Feighan	Murish	Waxman	Jenkins	Palman	Watkins
Ferraro	Mitchell	Weaver	Johnson	Pepper	Weber
Fish	Moakley	Weiss	Jones (NC)	Perkins	Whitehurst
Florio	Moody	Wheat	Jones (OK)	Petri	Whitley
Foglietta	Morrison (CT)	Williams (MT)	Jones (TN)	Pickle	Whittaker
Ford (MI)	Mrak	Wirth	Kasich	Porter	Whitten
Frank	Murphy	Wise	Kasen	Price	Winn
Garcia	Neal	Wolpe	Kemp	Purcell	Wolf
Gejdenson	Nowak	Wyden	Kindness	Quillen	Wortley
Gibbons	Osakar	Yates	Kramer	Ray	Wright
Gonzales	Oberstar	Yatron	LaFalce	Regula	Wylie
Goodling	Obey		Lagomarsino	Ridge	Young (AK)

NOES—247

Akaka	Brown (CO)	Craig	Alexander	NOT VOTING—16
Andrews (NC)	Broyhill	Crane, Daniel	Frenzel	
Andrews (TX)	Burton (IN)	Crane, Phillip	Biaggi	Savage
Annunzio	Byron	Daniel	Gephardt	Udall
Anthony	Campbell	Dannemeyer	Conyers	Williams (OH)
Archer	Carney	Daub	Heftel	Wilson
Aspin	Carper	Davis	Lent	
Badham	Chandler	de la Garza	Foley	
Barnard	Chappell	Dewine	Lewis (CA)	
Bartlett	Chappie	Dickinson	Rangel	
Batemann	Cheney	Dicks		
Bennett	Clinger	Dingell		
Bethune	Coats	Dowdy		
Bevill	Coleman (MO)	Dreier		
Bilirakis	Coleman (TX)	Duncan		
Bliley	Conable	Dyson		
Boggs	Cooper	Edwards (AL)		
Boner	Corcoran	Edwards (OK)		
Breaux	Coughlin	Emerson		
Britt	Courter	English		
Broomfield	Coyne	Erdreich		

□ 2020

Mr. TORRES and Mr. TAUKE changed their votes from "no" to "aye."

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

NOTICE

*Incomplete record of House proceedings.
House proceedings will be continued in the next issue of the Record.*

CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R.
3329

Mr. LEHMAN of Florida submitted the following conference report and statement on the bill (H.R. 3329) making appropriations for the Department of Transportation and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1984, and for other purposes:

CONFERENCE REPORT (H. REPT. NO. 98-318)

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 3329) making appropriations for the Department of Transportation and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1984, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the Senate recede from its amendments numbered 6, 7, 11, 25, 26, 42, 56, 59, and 68.

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate numbered 2, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 28, 31, 33, 34, 35, 38, 43, 50, 52, 57, 58, and 62, and agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 3:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 3, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert \$4,878,000; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 4:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 4, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert \$67,974,000; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 5:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 5, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert \$1,656,256,000; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 6:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 6, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert \$8,600,000; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 9:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 9, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert \$22,500,000; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 12:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate num-

bered 12, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert \$12,500,000; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 13:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 13, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert \$12,500,000; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 22:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 22, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the matter stricken and inserted by said amendment, insert: *including purchase of fourteen buses, \$14,250,000*; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 24:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 24, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert \$200,000,000; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 27:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 27, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

Restore the matter stricken by said amendment amended to read as follows:

RAILROAD-HIGHWAY CROSSINGS DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS

For necessary expense of certain railroad-highway crossings demonstration projects as authorized by section 163 of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1973, as amended, to remain available until expended, \$15,000,000, of which \$10,000,000 shall be derived from the Highway Trust Fund.

And the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 32:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 32, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

Restore the matter stricken by said amendment amended to change the sum named in said amendment to: \$5,000,000; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 37:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 37, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

Restore the matter stricken by said amendment amended to change the sum named to: \$2,500,000; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 40:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 40, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

Restore the matter stricken by said amendment amended to read as follows: *Provided*, That all unobligated balances in this account shall lapse at the end of fiscal year 1985; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 44:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 44, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert \$1,225,000,000; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 45:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 45, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert \$295,400,000; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 46:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 46, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert \$250,000,000; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 48:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 48, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert \$8,200,000; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 51:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 51, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert \$20,858,000; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 54:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 54, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert \$60,000,000; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 63:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 63, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert \$16; and the Senate agree to the same.

The committee of conference report in disagreement amendments numbered 1, 10, 14, 21, 23, 28, 30, 36, 39, 41, 47, 49, 53, 55, 60, 61, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, and 70.

WILLIAM LEHMAN,
MARTIN OLAV SABO,
WILLIAM H. GRAY III,
WILLIAM R. RATCHFORD,
BOB CARR,
ROBERT J. MRAZEK,
JAMIE L. WHITTEN,
LAWRENCE COUGHLIN,
SILVO O. CONTE,
JACK EDWARDS,
CARL PURSELL.

Managers on the part of the House.

MARK ANDREWS,
THAD COCHRAN,
JAMES ARDNOR,